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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

)
)
)

v.

)

LARRY HANSEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF SALT LAKE CITY
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE

)

Case No.

940214-CA

)

Priority No. 31

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over criminal appeals from
Circuit Courts pursuant to §78-2a-3(d), Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

A.

Issue:

Was there sufficient evidence in the

record to support the jury's conviction?
B.

Standard of Review:

The record should be reviewed

in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's guilty
verdict.

1

The Defendant wrongly classifies this matter as a Priority
2 case. Since the Defendant is not currently incarcerated (at
least not for this offense), the correct classification should be
Priority 3.
1

2.

A.

Issue:

Did certain questions asked of the

defendant by the prosecutor call to the jurors' attention matters
which they would not be justified in considering in reaching a
verdict?
B.

Standard of Review:

The jury's verdict should be

affirmed unless there is a reasonable likelihood that absent any
improper questions a different result would have occurred.
3.

A.

Issue:

Were certain statements made by the

prosecutor in closing argument unfairly prejudicial?
B.

Standard of Review:

The jury's verdict should be

affirmed unless there is a reasonable likelihood that absent any
prejudicial argument a different result would have occurred.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Salt Lake City Code §12-24-100.A.1. provides in pertinent
part:
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section
for any person to operate or be in actual physical control
of a vehicle within this city if the person has a blood or
breath alcohol content of .08 percent or greater by weight
as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the
alleged operation or physical control, or if the person is
under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol or any drug to a degree which renders
the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle within this
city.
(Emphasis added.)

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of the defendant for
operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and
driving on a suspended license.

The case was tried before a

jury, the Honorable Commissioner T. Patrick Casey presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On December 25, 1991, Warren Riggs, an employee of the

Utah National Guard, was driving northbound on 700 East in Salt
Lake City, in the vicinity of the intersection with Interstate 80
(Tr. 12.)
2.

Riggs saw a compact pickup driving in his same

direction swerving down the road, narrowly avoiding fixed
obstacles and running a red light.
3.

(Tr. 13-16.)

Riggs pursued the pickup and, when it turned off 700

East at 1700 South, pulled in front of it and forced it to stop.
(Tr. 18-19.)
4.

Riggs immediately got out of his vehicle and walked

back to the pickup truck.
5.

(Tr. 19.)

Riggs, within literally inches of a man he subsequently

identified to be the defendant, smelled alcohol on the
defendant's breath and observed a slurry, drunken speech pattern.
(Tr. 19-20.)
3

6.

Riggs, while not himself a drinker, was familiar with

the smell and effects of alcohol from frequently serving as a
designated driver for members of his National Guard unit.

(Tr.

16-17.)
7.

Riggs reached into the pickup and removed the keys from

the ignition.
8.

(Tr. 20.)

The defendant then got out of his vehicle, shouted

obscenities at Riggs, and staggered away.
9.

(Tr. 21-22.)

Riggs flagged down one Salt Lake City Police Officer,

and two other officers were also called to the scene.
10.

Police officers shortly thereafter went to the home of

the defendant and found him in bed.
11.

driver of the vehicle.

Riggs identified the defendant as the
(Tr. 23-24.)

At trial, two of the three police officers involved

were unavailable for testimony.
13.

(Tr. 23-24.)

The officers escorted the defendant out to the street

where Riggs was waiting.

12.

(Tr. 23.)

(Tr. 75-82.)

At trial, during both direct and cross-examinations,

Riggs told the jury about the erratic and unsafe driving pattern
of the pickup.

(Tr. 13-16 and 24-30.)
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14.

During the trial, Riggs repeatedly and unequivocally,

even on cross-examination, identified the defendant as the driver
of the pickup.
15.

(Tr. 34.)

Riggs also testified to his familiarity with the smell

and effects of alcohol and attributed both to the defendant.
(Tr. 16-17 and 37.)
16.

Counsel for the defendant did not object to Riggs1 lay

opinion as to the defendant's intoxication while driving the
pickup and even asked questions about the issue on crossexamination.
17.

(Tr. 16-17 and 37.)

The defendant chose to testify in his own defense

claiming that he had been only the passenger in the pickup, that
the actual driver had the usual "couple of beers", and that the
actual driver happened to look like the defendant.
18.

(Tr. 60-72.)

During cross-examination of the defendant, the

prosecutor asked whether the defendant had made certain prior
statements about the incident.

The prosecutor did not identify

the source of the alleged statements about which he was
inquiring.
19.

(Tr. 73-82.)
Defendant's counsel objected to the prosecutor asking

about the statements.

Defense counsel claimed that because the

statements were found in a police report which could not be
5

admitted because of the absence of the officers, even inquiring
about whether the statements were made was improper.

(Tr. 74-

82.)
20.

The Trial Judge, while overruling the objection,

required the prosecutor to modify the leading form of his
questions into a more direct form of examination regarding the
statements.
21.

(Tr. 75-82.)

Apparently becoming educated by the objections about

the subtleties of evidentiary rules, and learning that the
prosecutor could not introduce the police report, the eventual
answer from the defendant to the controversial line of
questioning regarding what the defendant told the police officer
was: "not to my knowledge." (Tr. 83.)
22.

During closing argument, the prosecutor argued: "Don't

let him fool you.

Don't let the wool be pulled over your eyes

with this story of going home."
23.

(Tr. 99.)

Defense counsel did not object during the entirety of

the prosecutor's primary closing argument.
24.

(Tr. 97-99.)

During his closing argument, defense counsel repeatedly

attacked the City's case because of the absence of the two police
officers.

In doing so, defense counsel himself pointed out the

6
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s own diiDi witness and opined that the

prosecutor was attempt ino ti. '"pier.. r""! game" with the jury:
Mr. Lampert has long h a n , onaggy beard, i ac^ ^ know what
clothes he was wearing. If I could have gone to him today
and asked him you bet I would have. Maybe he's with the
policeman that didn't come here today. Whar w«--- have here
was Warren telling the police he's got long hair, shaggy
beard, tan pant-1, whatever and some way, although once again
we weren't able to figure that out because the officer
•^ii't here, some way or another they track down mr. Hansen
who's in red. It would have been nice for me to be able to
ask that cop chat arrested him what color pants was he
wearing?
* s he in his pajamasV I think he testified he
was in hio pajamas. What kind of pants were laying on the
floor? Were they tan? Were they lev:: - as . . Hansen
remembers. That's the kind of thin-;
-.asking about.
That's the kind of thing I need the p o u c e officer here to
talk to us about. If the prosecutor is going to meet their
burden of proving theses charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
three cops were involved in this. Three police officers,
Hawks, Sorenson, and the fellow here today. One out of
three makes it in and they expect to be able to just get a
conviction? That's shoddy, shoddy work and they are not
able, and I hope that you will not allow them to play that
kind of game when we're talking about a citizen and his
right to a trial. He has a right to have all rhe evidence
put on there and not have one officer going off to his
training seminar and another one out of town. That is, 1
will argue to you that that is totally totally unprofessional and that is enough to find a reasonable doubt because
we don't know what happened.
(Tr. 101-10 2, emphas is added.)
25.

On rebuttal , the prosecutor attacked the defei idai it's

convenien t. 1.y horget. J"" u 1 memor y on the witness stand :
He goes home, passes out, sends back these other two, gets
caught it the friend f s' car, this wasn'*: Phil Lampert"'s car.
This car was somebody else's living in the house. So he
goes home and crashes. He ! s remembered everything pretty
well up until then. He remembered coming back from Park
7

City and going over to somebody's house and watching Phil
flrink. Watching thig Qther pergpn flrink, Everything all
the way up until the officer walks into his room and
suddenly he can't remember anything about that exchange. He
can't remember what he said to the officer. While he's
sitting on the stand, under oath, that's when he forgets.
The point when that objective presence is there defendant
forgets. If defendant hadn't forgotten he might have filled
us in on a lot of things. He might have focused in on what
happened after that point. What happened after the officer
showed up, after the arrest. (Tr. 106, emphasis added.)
26.

Defendant's counsel objected, claiming that the

prosecutor's argument somehow "shifted the burden of proof to the
defendant."
27.

(Tr. 108.)

The Trial Judge overruled the objection, stating his

opinion that the standard jury instruction regarding the lack of
weight to be given to counsel argument would be sufficiently
curative of any problems with the prosecutor's argument.

(Tr.

112-113.)
28.

When the jury was brought back into the courtroom, the

Court reiterated precisely such an instruction.
29.

(Tr. 113.)

The defendant was convicted on both charges.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

POINT I:

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
supporting the jury's verdict, the defendant's contention on
appeal that an eyewitness1 face-to-face identification is
8
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report as the source for statements inquired about.

As such,

asking the questions did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct.
POINT III.

CLOSING ARGUMENT PROPRIETY.

Defendant's counsel waived any claim regarding the
prosecutor's "don't let him fool you" closing argument by failing
to object.

Further, the "fool you" issue merely goes to the

inherent incredibility of the defendant's less-than-creative
completely unsubstantiated alibi.

Defense counsel, by referring

to the defendant's absent alibi witness and the absent police
officers, opened the door to the prosecutor's fair comment on the
defendant's forgetfulness regarding his own alibi.

The

prosecutor's conduct was, therefore, not improper.
POINT IV.

HARMLESS ERROR.

Even if any errors occurred in the proceedings below, their
total cumulative effect was harmless.

Riggs' testimony

unequivocally established the defendant as the driver of the
pickup and the fact that the defendant was under the influence of
alcohol to the extent that he was not driving the pickup safely.
The sheer mendacity of the defendant's alibi reeks even on the
printed page.

In light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt,

almost any error would have been harmless.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
TUP:

F-VIDENCE WAS S U F F I C I E N T T; SUPPORT
THE J U R Y ' S GUILTY VERD.1 * ' "

"In reviewing the sufficiency o
v

:.*-.:.

^-.:-

J inferences reasonably

therefrom in the light most favorable tv
assume [s] that the jury L--.-J--"
suppor t the verdict."
19 : r
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Lh« -jury verdict and
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State v. Wood, 8 L 8 P. „L

,

..:J"

Th- Court should affirun the iury verdict as "long as

triers

-;ie inferences, from

which findings ct

a±^ the requisite elements of the crime can

reasonably be made,"
]')8S) ; c:iLt-iI v\

State v. Booker,.

. :roval in Wood, 86b P.^u ai 6/.

The offense of driving under the influence of alcohol
requires the iul Lowi.ii'j OIUIILWIILU < >J! proof i
1#

t h e defendant;

2.

was driving a vehicle;

3.

unde r t" he i n f luence of alcohol ;

4.

to the extent that he could not operate the vehicle

safely;

11

5.

within the city limits of Salt Lake City.

(Section 12-24-100.A.1.)2
The defendant does not dispute that the events in question
occurred in Salt Lake City.

Taking the remaining elements in

order, there can be no doubt of the sufficiency of the evidence:
First and second, the defendant was identified by an
eyewitness as the driver of the pickup.

Third, the eyewitness,

without objection, testified to his familiarity with the smell
and physical indications of alcohol and intoxication.

Fourth,

the eyewitness testified that the pickup driven by the
defendant swerved across the road, onto curbs, narrowly avoided
fixed obstacles and ran a red light; i.e., was being driven
unsafely.
It is not reasonably possible to dispute that there is
sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury f s findings.
Further, on appeal, the defendant has the burden of marshalling
the evidence to support the jury's decision and showing that it
was insufficient.
1993).

See State v. Germonto. 868 P.2d 50, (Utah

The defendant failed to even attempt this effort.

2

Since the parties stipulated that the defendant's driver's
license had been suspended at the time of the incident, the
conviction on driving under the influence, by definition,
automatically proved the guilt of the other charge.
12

Defenda*';- '

--Deal on this issue appears to claim that

because the eyewitness was not a police officer, and not given
police officer t • >~

L O whether the

defendant was under the influence.

l

First, as noted abov-.

he

defendant waived this argument by tailing to or
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Of
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1985).
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Here, Lhe prosecutor adduced a mor^ than adequate

foundation *:r. support the lay witnesses 1 orL eqa i* di nq i ui (rx i fat. i on, and no objection was raised.
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POINT II.
THE PROSECUTOR'S CROSS-EXAMINATION
WAS PROPER
To properly evaluate the defendant's challenge to a
particular line of the prosecutor's questioning, it is important
to read the questions and not just the defense counsel's
objection as provided in the defendant's brief.

The initial

question is found on page 74 at line 21:
Q: ????
he?

and a police officer came into your bedroom didn't

ATD: I'd object to this, your Honor, at this point. I
think maybe I should do this outside of the presence of the
Jury.
The jury was then excused.

Only with the jury out of the

courtroom did defense counsel make the objection referenced on
page 5 of the defendant's brief.

Obviously, because no question

about defendant's prior statements contained in a police report
had yet been asked, there could be no prosecutorial misconduct.
Between pages 75 and 78, with the jury not present, the parties
discussed the propriety of the prosecutor's anticipated line of
questioning with the Court.

The Court, while declining to

declare a mistrial or strike the one question on this line asked
so far, required the prosecutor to use "open-ended questions

14

rather than statements of fact that you are asking him to
confirm."

(Tr. 77.)

The jury was then brought back into the courtroom and the
following questions occurred:
ATP: Mr. Hansen, what did you say to the officer in your
bedroom about your intoxicated state at the time?
WITNESS: He didn't ask me if I was intoxicated if I can
remember.
ATP: What did you say to the officer about your intoxicated
state at the time?
WITNESS:
Q:

I don't recall.

What did you say to the police officer. . .

JUDGE: Mr. Fisher and mr. Youngberg, if you'd approach for
a moment. (Pause) you may proceed, Mr. Fisher.
ATP: Thank you, your Honor. Mr. Hansen, while the officer
was standing in your bedroom, you spoke to him didn't you?
WITNESS:
Q:

Yes.

One of the things you said to the officer . . .

ATD: I'm going to object to this, your Honor, once again on
the same ground.
JUDGE: Ok. Let's ask the jury to step outside again. I
want to make sure that we clarify something and we'll bring
you right back in. I'm sorry for the inconvenience.
Again, defense counsel objected before the prosecutor could
even begin to read or reference any alleged prior statement made
by the defendant.

A further discussion between counsel and the
15

bench occurred during which the Court clarified its decision that
questions regarding prior statements should be asked in a nonleading manner.

Further, the Court determined to give a

clarifying instruction to the jury about the effect of
objections, unanswered questions and speculation.

(Tr. 79-82.)

Finally, with the jury again present, the last examination
on this subject occurred:
ATP: Thank you, your Honor. Mr. Hansen, as you were
speaking to the officer, did you say anything to the police
officer about his inability to prove that you had been
driving?
Witness:

Not to my knowledge.

Defense counsel did not object to this question and the
prosecutor moved on to a different subject.
The defendant relies on a decision by the Utah Supreme Court
in State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992), and by the Court of
Appeals in State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App. 1993), to
claim that the prosecutor's questions amounted to reversible
misconduct.

Both Emmett and Palmer involved child sex abuse

cases where the evidence of guilt was tenuous and the
prosecutorial misconduct blatant and repeated.

In Emmett. in

addition to several other misconducts, the prosecutor asked
Emmett on cross-examination "repeatedly" "if he had rehearsed his

16

testimony with his attorney."

Emmett. 839 P.2d at 786.

Similarly, in Palmer, the prosecutor asked whether the defendant
had previously admitted to a third party that he might have
"inappropriate" feelings for the child subsequently abused.
Palmer. 860 P.2d at 33 9.

Again, this improper question was in

addition to numerous other prosecutorial misconducts.
The facts here are completely different.

First, on the

first two out of three allegedly objectionable questions, the
prosecutor simply never was allowed by defense counsel to make
the statement which would have been objectionable.

The first

time that the prosecutor neared the subject, defense counsel
objected after the prosecutor had simply asked if a police
officer had come into the defendant's bedroom.

The second time,

the defense counsel interrupted the prosecutor before any
statement at all could be made.

Finally, on the third try,

defense counsel failed to object.
Thus, none of the harms about which this Court and the
Supreme Court expressed concerns in Palmer and Emmett could
possibly have occurred.

Moreover, unlike the situations in

Emmett and Palmer, the prosecutor had actual evidence that the
defendant had made the statements about which he was inquiring.
Had it been necessary, such statements could have been admitted
17

under any of several theories.

First, the prosecutor could have,

had it been necessary, used the police report to refresh the
defendant's recollection pursuant to Rule 612, U.R.E.

Second, as

a prior statement by the witness, the statement was admissible
pursuant to Rule 613, U.R.E.

Also, because they were not offered

to "prove the truth", but rather to impeach credibility, the
statements were not hearsay pursuant to Rule 801(c).

Further,

the statements were also non-hearsay pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)
and (2). Thus, this is not the type of situation where a
prosecutor deliberately oversteps all bounds of fairness to
concoct, out of thin air, a damaging line of examination which
leaves an impression or false innuendo of guilt.
Even if the prosecutor's three questions, mostly unasked and
all but one (without objection) unanswered, were improper, the
Court should reserve its analysis of the harmfulness of any error
in conjunction with its consideration of the entire case.
Palmer, 860 P.2d at 343.

This totality analysis is considered in

Point IV below.

18

POINT III.
THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
DID NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE MISCONDUCT
Defendant claims two separate portions of the prosecutor's
closing argument constituted reversible misconduct.

First,

defense counsel now objects, though he failed to object at trial,
to the prosecutor's admonition to the jury to "Don't let him fool
you.

Don't let the wool be pulled over your eyes with this story

of going home."

Of course, because no objection to this line of

argument was raised at trial, it is now waived unless it
constitutes plain error.
1993).

State v. Cabututan. 861 P.2d 408 (Utah

It is obviously not error of any kind.

The Utah Supreme

Court has long recognized the propriety in closing argument of
one side of a case claiming that the other party's "theories were
fabricated."

Germonto, 868 P.2d at 63.

Defendant's second claim of error relates to the prosecutor
calling attention to the conveniently forgetful memory of the
defendant testifying in his own behalf.
6-7).

(Defendant's Brief, pp.

Counsel for the City simply cannot understand defense

counsel's contention that commenting on a person's forgetfulness,
once he takes the stand, constitutes a shifting of the burden of
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proof.

The Utah Supreme Court has frequently stated that closing

argument allows counsel broad discretion:
Counsel for both sides have 'considerably more freedom in
closing argument' and a 'right to discuss fully from their
standpoints the evidence and the inferences and deductions
arising therefrom.'
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 860 (Utah 1992).

(Citations

omitted.)
Defense counsel contends that the prosecutor's statements in
this case somehow suggested to the jury "that a defendant bears a
responsibility to provide evidence in a criminal trial."
(Defendant's Brief, pp. 12-13.)

In fact, the prosecutor's

statements do nothing of the sort.

The prosecutor simply asked

the jury to infer from the defendant's conveniently forgetful
memory that the defendant was lying through his teeth, which he
obviously was.
Moreover, it was the defense counsel himself who invited
speculation about what the defendant's own missing alibi witness
would testify to.

Defense counsel said of this missing witness:

If I could have gone to [the alibi witness] today and ask
[sic] him you bet I would have. Maybe he's with the
policeman that didn't come here today. (Tr. 5.)
The prosecutor's fair comment on the defendant's alibi was
not misconduct especially in light of the Court's two clarifying
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instructions regarding the lack of weight the jury should give to
closing argument.
POINT IV.
EVEN IF ANY ERROR IS FOUND,
IT IS HARMLESS IN LIGHT OF THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF GUILT
AND THE INHERENT UNBELIEVABILITY
OF THE DEFENDANT'S ALIBI
Even if the prosecutor committed any misconduct or any other
errors were made during the trial, they did not prejudice the
defendant.

The standard for reversal for improper questioning,

closing argument or prosecutorial misconduct requires that such
an error be "substantial and prejudicial such that there is a
reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been
a more favorable result for the defendant."
P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993).

(Citations omitted.)

such prejudice could have resulted.

State v. Hay. 859
In this case, no

First, the three supposedly

objectionable questions were never really asked.

Second, these

questions were nowhere near as inflammatory, prejudicial or
unsupported as the questions in Palmer and Emmett.

Also, the

City's case against the defendant was far stronger on its own,
irrespective of any objectionable matters, than were the state's
cases in Palmer and Emmett.
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This case does not involve society's justifiable detestation
of child molesters and the admittedly shaky testimony of only the
victims in those two cases.

Here, an adult witness, beyond

reproach, question, doubt or impeachment unequivocally pinned
every element of the crime of driving under the influence,
without any objection, on the defendant.
Finally, the defendant's alibi is almost laughably
unbelievable.

The prosecutor has great latitude in pointing out

such weaknesses to the jury through cross-examination and closing
argument.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's litany of alleged errors, the standard
recitative from most minor criminal appeals, is for naught.

The

defendant was driving the pickup under the influence of alcohol,
careering down City streets without any care for anyone who might
be harmed by his illegal and reprehensible conduct.

He had the

misfortune, and the citizens of Salt Lake City had the good
fortune, to be stopped by a courageous private citizen heroically
determined not to tolerate any more carnage caused by drunken
drivers.
The citizen's unwavering identification to the jury of the
defendant and explanation of his unsafe driving patterns, alcohol
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smell, slurring and staggering is sufficient to render almost any
error in the trial, even assuming one occurred, harmless.

The

guilt of the defendant is further established by the inherent
unbelievability of his alibi.
The prosecutor's questions and closing argument were
entirely appropriate and unobjectionable.

The jury's guilty

verdict should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this -Sed day of December, 1994.

,

•/£

BRUCE R. B A I R D ~
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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